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AUR (en) - strongswan

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Package Details: strongswan 5.5.1-5

Git Clone URL: https://aur-dev.archlinux.org/strongswan.git (read-only)
Package Base: strongswan
Description: open source IPsec implementation
Upstream URL: http://www.strongswan.org
Keywords: IPsec strongswan
Licenses: GPL
Conflicts: openswan
Submitter: jayray
Maintainer: Thermi
Last Packager: Thermi
Votes: 99
Popularity: 2.646251
First Submitted: 2007-04-22 16:41
Last Updated: 2017-02-04 18:22

Latest Comments

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dkorzhevin commented on 2015-03-26 17:29

Thank you!

Thermi commented on 2015-03-26 14:04

Okay. There's a new release coming next week. I'll keep the package till then and upgrade. You can have it again after that, if you want.

dkorzhevin commented on 2015-03-26 13:57

Thanks for update, Thermi

I was out for long time :(

fauno commented on 2015-03-22 04:28

+1 to signature checking

Thermi commented on 2015-03-21 23:37

If an attacker was able to change the source array, he would also be able to remove the constraint for the pgp keys and the checksums array. So checking the signature wouldn't protect against that. Having the checksums array also does not help against such an attack.

mutantmonkey commented on 2015-03-21 23:26

Thermi: It is true that the public key of the signer is needed, however you're mistaken about which keychain is used by makepkg. It uses the local user keychain, not the pacman keychain.

I suppose it is a bit more cumbersome, but it only needs to be done once. If a malicious user gains access to the AUR and changes this package to point to a malicious copy of strongswan, they wouldn't be able to sign it with the existing key. Users who already have the existing key imported will no longer be able to build the package unless they import the key that signed the malicious version as well.

For security software like strongswan, signature checking is pretty important.

Thermi commented on 2015-03-21 21:21

@mutantmonkey: That is wrong. To verify the signature, the public key of the signer is needed. As the archive is signed by Andreas Steffen and not an Arch Linux developer, his public key is not in the default key chain. makepkg, which is used by AUR helpers to build the packages, uses the pacman key chain. The pacman key chain is populated with the file '/usr/share/pacman/keyrings' which is contained in the archlinux-keyring package and any public key which is manually added by the user. Therefore, the signature can not be verified unless the key ring is manually added by the user to the keyring. This is cumbersome and foreign to many users and does not provide additional security, as the PKGBUILD already checks the SHA256 checksum, which is not forgable, unless the PKGBUILD is changed by an unauthorized malicious third party. This scenario is very unlikely, as it would imply bigger problems than this.

mutantmonkey commented on 2015-03-21 21:08

Thanks for the package. I would appreciate it if you could add signature checking. There's nothing complicated about it: just download the .sig as well, and add the following line to the PKGBUILD:
validpgpkeys=('948F158A4E76A27BF3D07532DF42C170B34DBA77')

Thermi commented on 2015-03-21 17:52

I had the package orphaned and adopted it. I built and uploaded the newest version of strongswan with a couple of patches for bugs and missing features. Enjoy.

zeroflag commented on 2015-02-21 10:10

Please, update the PKGBUILD file with: current release version "5.2.2" with md5 hash "7ee1a33060b2bde35be0f6d78a1d26d0" for the "strongswan-5.2.2.tar.bz2" file. Compiles fine and works fine as well. Thanks.